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Linda Zagzebski’s book on epistemic authority is an  impressive and 
stimulating treatment of an  important topic.1 I  admire the way she 
manages to combine imagination, originality and argumentative control. 
Her work has the further considerable merit of bringing analytic thinking 
and abstract theory to bear upon areas of concrete human concern, such 
as the attitudes one should have towards moral and religious authority. 
The book is stimulating in a way good philosophy should be – provoking 
both disagreement and emulation.
I agree with much of what she says, and have been instructed by it, but 
it will be of more interest and relevance here if I concentrate upon areas 
of disagreement. Perhaps they are better seen as areas, at least some of 
them, where her emphases suggest a position that seems to me untenable, 
but that she may not really intend. In that event, I will be happy to have 
provoked a clarification or the dispelling of my misunderstanding.
My focus will be upon problems in her account of communal 
authority and autonomy, especially with respect to religious and political 
authority. Here my worry is that she places too much trust in trust and 
not enough in what I call selective mistrust.
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY: SOME PRELIMINARIES
I  have in the past written quite a  bit on a  topic central to Zagzebki’s 
discussion, namely the role of testimony in our intellectual life, especially 
in my book Testimony: a Philosophical Inquiry.2 Moreover, the relation of 
1 Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and 
Autonomy in Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). References to this book will 
be bracketed in the text.
2 C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
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testimonial authority to autonomy was something I visited a little more 
recently in a paper on ‘Testimony and Intellectual Autonomy’.3 I think 
that much of what I said there is congruent with Zagzebski’s discussion 
of the way an  individual’s autonomy can be consistent with a  certain 
deference to the authority of another’s testimony and even of their beliefs 
revealed in non-testimonial fashion, but I detect a dissonance (to use one 
of her favoured expressions) between us when it comes to the authority 
of religious and political communities.
Where we agree is in rejecting what she calls epistemic egoism; 
a version of which embodies what J. L. Mackie once discussed as an ideal 
of autonomous knowledge built into the empiricist tradition, namely, 
the view that our wide-ranging dependence on testimony could only be 
admitted as knowledge or reliable belief if (to quote him) ‘the knower 
somehow checks for himself the credibility of the witness’ whenever 
he relies upon one.4 It is clear from the rest of the Mackie passage that 
‘checks for himself ’ means relying solely upon checks that use only the 
knower’s individual resources and are quite independent of anybody’s 
testimony. There are actually two possible interpretations of the egoism 
or individualism inherent in the tradition as Zagzebski makes clear in 
her book.
The first (what she calls ‘extreme egoism’) admits no role for the 
transfer of knowledge from others and restricts one’s knowledge to 
what one can acquire solely by one’s own individual epistemic abilities. 
This would, of course, lead to an  extraordinarily narrow knowledge 
base for any person, though it is possibly what Plato had in mind in 
his comments on how testimony could not provide the logos that true 
knowledge (or understanding) requires. Interestingly, as Zagzebski 
notes, Elizabeth Fricker refers to this extreme position as ‘intellectual 
autonomy’, but what Zagzebski calls ‘moderate’ or ‘standard’ egoism 
and what I have called reductionism is more in tune with the tradition 
Mackie articulates, certainly in David Hume’s discussion of reports of 
miracles.5 The extreme form is however still in play when people discuss 
moral autonomy since the idea that, in moral matters you must reach 
3  C. A. J. Coady, ‘Testimony and intellectual autonomy’, Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science, Part A 33 (2):355-372 (2002).
4  J. L. Mackie, ‘The Possibility of Innate Knowledge’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, 70:245-257 (1969), p. 254.
5  David Hume, An  Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 10 ‘On 
Miracles’, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957).
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moral knowledge wholly by reliance upon your own resources has much 
more popularity. Zagzebski argues, correctly in my view, that there are 
serious problems with it, but I will not discuss moral knowledge directly.
I  argued in my book that such egoism or reductionism about 
testimony was doomed to failure since it didn’t take seriously the depth 
of our reliance upon the word of others. I criticised attempts to vindicate 
that reliance by recourse alone to individual sources of knowledge or 
reliable belief such individual perceptions, memories and inferences as 
doomed to failure. Not only were such attempts vitiated by impracticality 
(as H. H. Price had argued) because of the time-consuming amount 
of individual checking on the reliability of witnesses or other types 
of testifiers that the posture entailed, but most of the procedures that 
were apparently reliant only upon my unaided powers of observation, 
memory and inference were actually infected at core by further reliance 
upon unchecked interpersonal sources. The concepts of ‘observation’ 
and ‘experience’ that figured in such individualist efforts were invariably, 
at least in part, appeals to common experiences and observations rather 
than the individual’s alone. Moreover, there were profound difficulties 
in determining the correlations between types of report and types of 
situation that the project required without again begging the question. 
Nor could the project be restricted to determining the reliability of this 
or that witness on this or that topic since what was required was a more 
general justification of, as it were, the institution of testimony. There is 
much more that could be said of this but I cannot say it here.
It is worth noting, however, that the widespread neglect of the topic of 
testimony that I originally complained of has been dramatically remedied 
and a  debate between reductionist and non-reductionist theories has 
developed apace with much sophistication and complex distinctions on 
both sides. I do not intend entering this debate directly here, but I am 
unpersuaded that the egoist position has been restored by that debate.6
6 Some important contributions in book form are: Jonathan E. Adler, Belief ’s Own 
Ethics (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 2002); Jennifer Lackey, Learning From Words: 
Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Jennifer 
Lackey and Ernest Sosa (eds), The Epistemology of Testimony (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006); and Paul Faulkner, Knowledge on Trust (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011). There are many other significant journal articles on the topic including 
Elizabeth Fricker, ‘Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the 
Epistemology of Testimony’, Mind 104 (414):393-411 (1995); and Peter J. Graham, 
‘Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-Inferential?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 
56 (2006), 84–95.
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The debate has encompassed other dimensions concerned with 
the moral or evaluative aspects associated with the attitudes of trust, 
acceptance, and mode of delivery involved in giving and receiving 
testimony. These have fed into a parallel philosophical movement that 
began in the 1980s investigating trust as a phenomenon and attitude in 
human affairs. The moral and epistemological aspects of trusting have 
been discussed by some excellent philosophers, many of them women, 
and most notably by Annette Baier.7 The epistemological aspect of this 
complex of investigations has often developed under the heading of 
social epistemology.
ZAGZEBSKI’S POSITIVE ACCOUNT AND THE ROLE OF SELF-TRUST
One issue that is nested in these discussions is that of intellectual or 
epistemic autonomy and its relation to authority. Zagzebski’s account of 
this relation requires a version of anti-reductionism though her theory 
goes beyond reliance on testimony. Her theory is not content with 
showing the futility of the reductionist position, but argues for a non-
egoist justification of our epistemic reliance on others and hence on 
the authority they have for us; this argument makes a positive virtue of 
beginning from the first-person perspective and from the idea of trust 
in the self. This strategy is interesting and original precisely because it 
recognizes some of the strength in the egoist’s insistence on the importance 
of the intellectual standing of the self. There are two key ideas here. The 
first is that an individual’s own epistemic base, the base that is to underpin 
epistemic autonomy, and is relied upon by the epistemic egoist, rests on 
nothing other than a form of trust – trust in the self ’s cognitive powers. 
So the very powers of personal observation, memory and inference are 
themselves inevitably taken on trust. This conclusion arises from the 
fact that there is a  circularity in any attempt to justify an  individual’s 
basic epistemic resources since ultimately any such attempt relies upon 
those same resources. Many epistemologists, such as Richard Foley and 
William Alston, have recognised this, sometimes through consideration 
of the challenge of extreme scepticism and sometimes simply by reflecting 
upon the nature of rationality. Whether this resort ‘refutes’ scepticism or 
not, it is clear that it renders the attempt to use our reasoning powers 
7 Annette Baier has made numerous contributions to the trust discussion beginning 
with her influential article, ‘Trust and Antitrust’ in Ethics, Ethics 96 (2):231-260 (1986).
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to reject our reasoning powers curiously pointless for any endeavour to 
sketch the lineaments of our epistemological landscape. But Zagzebski 
goes further than this in arguing that the trust is not only forced upon us 
by the circularity, it is a requirement of another feature of our nature, or 
even a requirement of rationality, namely the need to reduce or eliminate 
dissonance. This dissonance operates at two levels. Since she thinks 
of rationality as ‘doing a  better job of what we do naturally’ (p.  45) it 
requires self-reflection upon our natural inclination and apparent powers 
to seek truth. Awareness of the circularity creates a dissonance for the 
self-reflective person between trusting her natural epistemic faculties 
and believing that they are untrustworthy. It also creates a dissonance 
between the feeling that one’s faculties are trustworthy and the feeling 
that they are not. The self-reflective person will need to resolve this 
dissonance as well. Compare the person who has every reason to believe 
that she has locked her house but has an obsessive doubt about it and 
not only returns home several times to check on it, but constantly feels 
that she ought through the rest of the day.8 It is possible to persist in such 
behaviour yet it is not only disabling, but clearly subject to the charge of 
irrationality. Such a charge is even more plausible where the dissonance 
is across the board of all one’s natural epistemic powers. Hence, for 
Zagzebski, self-trust is a requirement of rationality. Further to this she 
argues that although self-reflection yields a rational trust in our faculties, 
it requires conscientious self-reflection in the use of those faculties to 
have a good chance of getting at the truth. As she puts it:
A conscientious person has evidence she is more likely to get the truth 
when she is conscientious, but she trusts evidence in virtue of her 
trust in herself when she is conscientious, not conversely. Her trust 
in herself is more basic than her trust in evidence, and that includes 
evidence of reliability. The identification of evidence, the identification 
of the way to handle and evaluate evidence, and the resolution of 
conflicting evidence all depend on the more basic property of epistemic 
conscientiousness. (p. 49)
Her next move is to generalise the trust involved to encompass trust in 
others. This requires a sort of universalising principle that has a Kantian 
flavour. Since I find that others have broadly the same epistemic capacities 
that I trust in myself I have no reason not to treat their situation as similar 
8 This is a variation on an example of my colleague Karen Jones, cited by Zagzebski 
in the text.
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to mine with respect to self-trust and the exercise of conscientious 
reflection. So she thinks that consistency demands that ‘I have the same 
basic trust in the epistemic faculties of all other persons whose general 
similarity to me I come to believe when I am conscientious’ (p. 160). She 
thinks there is a prima facie case for the same conclusion with respect 
to moral beliefs. This leads to what she calls a weak form of epistemic 
universalism which she expresses as ‘the fact that another person has 
a certain belief always gives me prima facie reason to believe it’ (p. 58).
SOME PRINCIPLES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Out of a  great deal of close discussion of these matters she develops 
a variety of principles concerning more stringent justification of beliefs 
and emotions gained from others. I cannot explore all of this but a flavour 
of the principles in question can be gained from mentioning a  few of 
them. First is one that makes a connection, as do several others, with the 
idea of authority and indirectly with that of autonomy. Consider:
Justification Thesis 2 for the Authority of Belief (JAB 2)
The authority of another person’s belief for me is justified by my 
conscientious judgment that I  am more likely to form a  belief that 
survives my conscientious self-reflection if I believe what the authority 
believes than if I try to figure out what to believe myself.
It is noteworthy that this principle embraces more than justification of the 
testimony of others since what they believe may be shown in behaviour 
rather than explicit testimony. It is thus rather stronger than a testimony 
principle and perhaps more debatable since someone who seriously tells 
us that p is vouching for it in a way that their non-testimony behavioural 
manifestations of belief typically do not. This difference is important and 
is connected to Zagzebski’s derivation of other-trust from self-trust, but 
I shall merely note it here, and will concentrate my criticisms mostly on 
areas where epistemic trust is in play in dealing with explicit religious 
(and political) statements of belief.9
9 Her principle concerning trust in testimony is formally parallel to this trust in belief 
principle (though actually she has two formulations of both) and goes as follows:
‘Justification Thesis 2 for the Authority of Testimony (JAT 2)
The authority of another person’s testimony for me is justified by my conscientious 
judg ment that if I believe what the authority tells me, the result will survive my conscient-
ious self-reflection better than if I try to figure out what to believe myself.’ (p. 133)
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It is also slightly puzzling that principle JAB 2 begins with phrase ‘the 
authority of another person’s belief ’ and concludes with a reference to 
that person’s belief as ‘what the authority believes’. This is puzzling as that 
person is not introduced as ‘an authority’ but simply as ‘another person’. 
Since she thinks that any other person has some prima facie authority for 
us in their beliefs this may be all she means by calling any ‘other person’ 
an  authority. But this is not the usual sense of ‘an  authority’, nor is it 
quite the sense that she later relies upon. This is important for my later 
discussion of communal belief and communal authority.
Later she provides a community version of the principle that goes as 
follows:
Justification of Communal Epistemic Authority 2 (JCEA2)
The authority of my community is justified for me by my conscientious 
judgment that if I  believe what We believe, the result will survive my 
conscientious self-reflection better than if I  try to figure out what to 
believe in a way that is independent of US.
Several points of clarification are needed here. The references to ‘we’ and 
‘us’ in the communal authority case is partly based on the common use 
of these pronouns to refer to communities to which individuals belong, 
but she takes this use to be a good indicator that the communities we 
belong to are what she calls ‘extended selves’. She recognises that the 
forms of authority in such communities differ widely in those that have 
democratic structures to determine authority and those that are more 
top-down. She also recognises the fallibility of the extended self but 
argues that its imperfections are no barrier to the judgement that we 
do better at getting the truth by relying on the authority than by going 
it alone. If we make the conscientious judgement that the authority’s 
record is so bad that we do better making the judgements without 
it then we need to transfer to another community or build a  new 
community (p. 158). That we can reasonably reject an authority’s belief 
(or testimony) is admitted by Zagzebski early in her discussion because 
it is a general trust in ourselves that leads to our trust in authority and 
that self-trust may be exercised to reject the authority’s belief, if for 
example, I conscientiously judge that it is clearly inconsistent with other 
conscientiously determined beliefs.
She carries this apparatus of arguments and principles over to the 
discussion of moral and religious epistemic authority and touches upon 
political authority. In this endeavour she is committed to there being 
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truth attainable in moral and religious matters and she argues for this 
commitment. Some, perhaps many, will dispute this, but I am going to 
accept it, partly because I believe it to be true, but mostly because I want 
to see whether what she makes of it in terms of authority is cogent.
Another of Zagzebski’s important discussions concerns the role of 
emotions and of exemplars in the acquisition of knowledge. I  cannot 
explore this fully here, but mention it at this point because of its relevance 
to some of her claims about religious, moral and political authority that 
I will criticise later. She holds that a conscientious person should trust her 
emotional faculties in the same way that she should trust her cognitive 
faculties since although there is no non-circular justification for the 
reliability of either yet the ‘outputs of both can survive conscientious self-
reflection’ (p. 86). Of course some emotions do not match appropriately 
the circumstances in our lives but others can be judged appropriate 
by a self-conscious attempt to fit them to their objects. Amongst these 
emotions that can be trusted are indignation, sympathy, the feel for the 
ridiculous, and admiration. Admiration is significant in leading to the 
idea of exemplars. We can admire qualities and acts but also persons who 
display them, and we can and should learn from them. Zagzebski argues 
that this applies across the board to the intellectual, moral and practical 
qualities that are encapsulated in the concept of wisdom, until recently 
little explored by philosophers (pp. 81ff.). This learning from exemplars 
often involves a role for imitation.
COMMUNAL AUTHORITY IN RELIGION AND IN POLITICS
This account of Zagzebski’s position is inevitably sketchy and 
oversimplified. I can only hope that it gives a fair understanding of her 
main line of thought sufficient to raise some issues about her account 
of intellectual autonomy and communal authority in religious, moral 
and political matters. In order to address that I will pass over difficulties 
raised by her argument from dissonance where, for example, one might 
question the strength of the need to resolve dissonance on which she relies 
so much, or the precise details of the consistency or universalisability 
argument she uses in the foundation of her theory, and so on. I think she 
can probably be defended against objections along these lines but I will 
not attempt that here. I will however say something about dissonance 
and the self in relation to trust in institutional authority.
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Her defence of authority in the epistemic arena is anti-reductionist 
in a way that, as we have seen earlier, runs counter to certain common 
ideological outlooks about authority and autonomy. I agree with her idea 
that, to put it in different terms, intellectual authority is not an external, 
as it were, regrettable necessity to be treated invariably with suspicion, 
but I think that her treatment of communal authority is unsatisfactory 
in certain respects. The idea of a  community as an  extended self has 
some obvious merits but the extension is rarely as straightforward 
as her treatment often suggests. The discourse of ‘we’ and ‘our’ is real 
enough, but the referent of these expressions is rarely straightforward. 
The nuances in such references are particularly complex in the case 
of political authority to which she does not pay a  lot of attention. 
A  political community is invariably composed of sub-communities 
that are either directly political themselves, as with political parties, or 
communities devoted in the first place to ends other than the political 
but with interests, values and beliefs that bear upon the political and 
drive political thinking. So an  individual’s extended self is likely to be 
extended in several different, potentially clashing directions. A person 
who sees herself as a member of the mining community, the Anglican 
church, the aboriginal community, and her small township is likely to 
have respected exemplars in each of these ‘extended selves’ and will often 
have to do some strong negotiating to avoid a schizophrenic ‘extended 
self ’. Zagzebski links her discussion of epistemic authority to the project 
that an  ‘executive self ’ has of harmonising her desires, emotions and 
beliefs in pursuit of fulfilment, and there is much to be said for this. But 
the executive self who self-reflectively examines this situation will have 
to come to terms with clashes internal to her community. This will often 
enough involve admiration for different authority figures with different 
key beliefs amongst some or many overlapping beliefs. Some of these 
will be contemporary figures and others figures from the near or distant 
past. Before looking further at politics, I want to examine what she says 
about religious communities with the above discussion as background 
because, in addition to the intrinsic interest of religious authority (and 
autonomy), there are certain parallels between religious and political 
communities.
A cautionary note is that Zagzebski, in discussing the shortcomings 
of Joseph Raz’s definition of political authority as a model for authority 
more generally, concentrates on small communities which suggests 
that she has some misgiving about extending the account she develops 
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regarding them to larger political communities. It is I  think more 
likely that she focuses on small communities to show more readily her 
differences with Raz rather than as a  sign that she cannot extend her 
account more broadly, since she finishes with principles of justification 
of communal authority that contain no such qualification about small 
size, and in any case small communities are often composed of smaller 
communities again with similar problems to those I  have hinted at. 
Moreover, she later applies her principles to huge communities like 
the Catholic Church, so it seems size is not a reasonable differentiating 
factor. She says some other things about Raz and political authority that 
invoke something different and I will return to that.
When Zagzebski discusses religious epistemic authority she notes that 
different religions have evolved very different structures or techniques 
to convey or exercise communal authority and these range from highly 
formal edifices like the ‘teaching office of the Catholic Church’ (p. 176) 
to the informal immersion in a way of life like the Old Order Amish. 
I think the contrast here is not as sharp as it appears, but the Catholic 
community, tradition and teaching authority is in any case understood by 
Zagzebski in too monolithic a fashion, admittedly a fashion encouraged 
by the institution’s formal leadership. Within any existing community 
of knowledge or belief, including religions, there will be various 
sub-communities sharing some respect for the authority of other sub-
communities, but differing from them in important ways, and similarly 
there will be different exemplars favoured by different members of such 
sub-communities. Think, for instance, of the philosophy community 
within a country or even within a particular university.
In speaking of the way that we accept or reject communal authority, 
Zagzebski appears, at least some of the time, to think of it as an all or 
nothing affair in what seems to me an  unrealistic way. She admits, as 
we saw earlier, that if we make the conscientious judgement that the 
authority’s record is so bad that we do better making the judgements 
without it then we need to transfer to another community or build a new 
community (p. 158). But an autonomous self in a religious community 
negotiates its membership and its shared beliefs in a much more dynamic 
and interactive way than this picture suggests. To take the example of the 
Catholic Church: its highly authoritative structure and the edicts of its 
official leadership have often in the past been at odds with widespread 
beliefs of sections of the faithful and continue (even more dramatically) 
to be so today. The great degree of this rift is evident in both doctrinal, 
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moral and ‘disciplinary’ matters as is evidenced by a variety of polling 
figures of ordinary Catholics’ beliefs about the morality of contraception, 
homosexuality, divorce, abortion, the doctrines of hell and ‘no salvation 
outside the Church’, and the disciplines of clerical celibacy and 
an exclusively male priesthood.10 Gallup Poll figures in 2009 showed that 
40 percent of Catholics in the USA (compared to 41% of non-Catholics) 
found abortion ‘morally acceptable’.11 Nor can this sort of result be 
put down to simple lay ignorance or backsliding since the rift is also 
present amongst regular lay churchgoers and similar disagreement is 
evident amongst clergy and theologians. For instance, even among those 
who attend church once a week or more, 83 percent of sexually active 
Catholic women use a form of contraception banned by the Vatican.12 
Such divergence has sometimes led to splintering and the formation of 
new communities or departure from religious community altogether, 
and that fits Zagzebski’s picture. But it has also been contained within 
the community so that quite different positions on what it is necessary 
to believe have been maintained without splitting the ‘We’ and ‘Us’ 
extended selves.13 How can this be?
One way of dealing with this is to distinguish between core and 
peripheral beliefs, and argue that as long as the core beliefs are centrally 
authoritative for the community members, there is room for diversity on 
the others. This distinction has some merit, but determining the division 
between what is core and what is peripheral is often enough something 
10  Just some of the recent evidence from respectable polls can be found (for the 
United States) in regular reports in the journal Catholics for Choice. For a summary of 
findings see: Catholics for Choice. (2011). The Facts Tell the Story, Catholics and Choice, 
Washington DC: <http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/documents/Factstellthestoryweb.
pdf> [accessed 30/01/2014]. Recently, in the UK, the sociologist, Professor Linda 
Woodhead, conducted a poll (administered by YouGov) that reported similar findings. 
See http://faithdebates.org.uk/research/. For Woodhead’s own summary of the research 
see her essay, ‘New Poll: “Faithful Catholics” an  Endangered Species’, in Religion 
Dispatches, January 20, 2014. Available at: <http://www.religiondispatches.org/archive/
culture> [accessed 25/11/2014].
11 See: <http://www.gallup.com/poll/117154/Catholics-Similar-Mainstream-Abortion-
Stem-Cells.aspx> [accessed 30/01/2014].
12 Catholics for Choice, 2011.
13 An interesting example of tolerated dissent within the wider Catholic community 
on an  important issue is the fierce and unresolved dispute between the Jesuits and 
Dominicans in the 16th and 17th centuries about the nature of grace and its relation to 
free will. This was an issue at the heart of theological controversy leading to the Catholic/
Protestant split in the Reformation, so its failure to disrupt Catholic unity in this later 
period is instructive.
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that authority will want a  say upon, and it is often enough, precisely 
that ‘say’ which is contested. Moreover, ‘peripheral’ need not mean 
unimportant; it may signal merely that the issue is not one on which 
authenticity of one’s membership in the community should turn. In the 
case of the Catholic Church, for instance, it seems to me as a Catholic 
(and of course to others, Catholic or not) that the ordination of women 
priests is such a peripheral matter, as is the celibacy of the clergy. Yet the 
formal ‘teaching office’ sees things differently.
THE COMPLEXITIES OF INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
This raises the question of institutional authority. Communities seem 
inevitably to generate their distinctive institutions, and these equally 
inevitably make claims to a  certain authority both practical and 
epistemic. The practical dimension can be more or less coercive, but 
always involves power of some sort. That is very characteristic of politics, 
but exists elsewhere.
The question of power returns us to the ambiguity about the nature 
of the authority of others that I noted earlier in Zagzebski’s expression of 
Principle JAB 2. The fact that each person has some presumptive authority 
for others about their beliefs (if it is a fact) is different from the authority 
that designated ‘authorities’ have for their beliefs in certain areas. We 
can assume that ordinary folk usually have the expertise that goes with 
the normal operation of their cognitive faculties, broadly construed, and 
that gives their beliefs what authority they have for others, but those we 
honour with the title ‘expert’ or ‘authority’ have special skills or status 
that require a  further explanation. The existence of such authorities is 
often connected with institutions rather than communities simpliciter. 
In both, epistemic authority can be exercised, formally in the one and 
less formally in the other, though there is an interaction between the two 
that can take positive or negative forms, involving either endorsement 
or opposition.
Zagzebski does not discuss institutional authority directly but it 
is something that brings a  political dimension into the discussion of 
authority and autonomy in even the most relaxed, informal community 
contexts. It also, I think, provides more room for a degree of epistemic 
and practical caution to operate concerning the exercise of authority 
that goes beyond what Zagzebski usually allows. In the case of religion 
this means that there is room for tension as well as support between 
13COMMUNAL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST
what we might call a wisdom dimension and an institutional dimension 
to community authority. This relationship also calls into question any 
attempt to think of the authority of ‘we’ or ‘us’ in isolation from epistemic 
authority residing outside that community.
Zagzebski has an interesting discussion of wisdom and she points out 
correctly that it has, until very recently, received scant attention amongst 
contemporary philosophers. Recognition of wise people involves ceding 
a degree of epistemic authority to their views, but the institutional leaders 
of a religious community are not invariably wise people so that a tension 
may readily arise between their authority and that of the exemplars 
of wisdom in the community. The same is true, perhaps more acutely, 
of political authority. Short of wisdom, we can expect that communal 
authorities have some knowledge of areas relevant to their authority, 
indeed that is bound up with their being epistemic authorities, but where 
they occupy positions of institutional authority, it may become apparent 
that they lack not only wisdom but even the relevant knowledge. They 
also view themselves as guardians of the integrity of the institution 
and they are invested with the formal powers that go with institutional 
office. These facts expose them to the temptations of power and self-
righteousness, and to the temptations of placing the need to ‘save face’ 
for the institution above the demands of justice (including epistemic 
justice – a topic discussed by Miranda Fricker) and accountability.14
A striking illustration of these dual temptations is provided within 
the Catholic Church by the alarming extent of clerical sex abuse of 
children as well as the ‘Magdalene’ incarceration and brutalising of young 
women in certain Irish convents (and elsewhere).15 These tragedies 
were compounded by the appalling behaviour of the clerical authorities 
engaging in concealment, disingenuous denials, lies, and cover-ups 
when responding to information about those practices. Some of this 
involves the abuse of practical religious or political authority, but quite 
a lot of it involves the abuse or failure of epistemic authority, since the 
victims and the wider Catholic community trusted the clerical leaders 
to know what was right in doctrine and morals, to tell the truth about 
14 For Fricker’s interesting views, see Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and 
Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
15 The horrors of these convent practices have recently been dramatised in two films 
‘The Magdalene Sisters’ and ‘Philomena’. I  cannot vouch for the detailed accuracy of 
these films, but there is little doubt about the factual situation from which their fiction 
(or ‘faction’) is derived.
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how they acted on it, and to receive information in good faith. Where the 
abuses were not simply the result of outright vice and hypocrisy, as the 
individual sexual offences had been, the cover-ups and lies were often 
justified at the time by beliefs about the need to preserve the authority 
and reputation of the institution. In addition, the maltreatment of the 
women ‘sinners’ and their babies, for instance, were sometimes justified 
by authoritative religio-moral teachings about sex, about punishment 
for sin, and more broadly about extra-marital parenthood. Some of 
these beliefs were of course shared not only with many rank and file 
Catholics at the time but also with many in the wider community in 
Ireland and elsewhere. The involvement of parents and the Irish State in 
the Magdalene scandal supported the Church’s role. Yet this itself really 
highlights some of the difficulties in isolating the religious authority of 
one community (whether epistemic or practical) from that of others.
The Catholic Church is not indeed unique in having such abuses 
perpetrated by its office-holders, and having higher authorities spurn the 
victims, protect the offenders, and guard the institution’s reputation with 
secrecy, subterfuge and outright lies. On the list of abusive institutions 
investigated by the Australian Government’s current Royal Commission 
on institutional sex abuse are: The Salvation Army, Scouts Australia, 
the YMCA, and an  Anglican children’s home. As this list shows, the 
problems are not restricted to religious institutions; besides the Scouts 
and the YMCA in Australia, in the UK the BBC and numerous public 
hospitals have been investigated by the police and other public bodies 
about their roles in the entertainer Jimmy Savile’s ghastly depredations 
against young people over a period of 40 years.
A  further feature of the clerical sex-abuse disaster is the degree to 
which the failures were abetted by reluctance to believe that members of 
the priestly fraternity were capable of such crimes. It is hard to know how 
much this factor worked with the authorities themselves, but, amongst 
other things, the reluctance indicates an excessive personal and epistemic 
trust (especially by parents) in the authority of religious leaders.
THE AUTHORITY OF ‘EXTERNAL’ COMMUNITIES
This brings us to another aspect of communal identity and the extended 
self which is that any given person is a  member of many, often very 
different communities, external to the community in question and 
its sub-communities. And even when not directly a  member of other 
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communities the knowledge held in those communities can be accessible 
to outsiders and relevant to their communal beliefs. So, in the case of 
religion, especially historically-oriented religions like Christianity 
and Islam, which are also religions of a  book, the understanding of 
that religion’s beliefs (core or otherwise) can be affected by knowledge 
or belief gained in scholarly communities such as those of history, 
philosophy, science and linguistics. Deference to the authority of such 
communities must have some impact for what survives the conscientious 
self-reflection of any member of the religious community.
In rejecting epistemic egoism, Zagzebski nonetheless insists that the 
autonomous self must be able to subject her reliance upon particular 
beliefs gained from authorities to ‘critical self-reflection’ (p. 228). Unlike 
epistemic egoism, this critical stance does not eschew all recourse to 
authoritative testimony nor accept only that which it can independently 
verify by its own individualistic resources, nor reject a role for emotion 
or the exemplary. But this means that it is not rigidly bound by its 
adherence to particular communal authority. I  think Zagzebski does 
and should accept this much. But my argument goes further because 
I want to say that the communal authority itself is similarly open to such 
critical self-reflection and that opens the prospect of belief revision at 
the communal and institutional level as well. So the individual’s rejection 
of some community belief or (in the institutional case) some official 
teaching may count as an effort to revise the community’s self-conscious 
reflection and its results rather than, as Zagzebski usually puts it, 
a rejection of the community and its authority. Just when such revisions 
count as a rejection of what the community stands for or reveal a more 
authentic understanding of its reality is a difficult question, but it cannot 
be taken for granted that every such revision is a  rejection. Consider 
the Irish child abuse scandals: Zagzebski’s option of departure from 
the community is certainly one possibility, indeed it is the one which 
so many Irish Catholics have taken, but their departure is something 
the institution and many who remain in the Catholic community deeply 
regret. Not only that, but others, who are equally outraged by the beliefs 
and performance of the authorities, have stayed in the community 
vowing to reform the attitudes, beliefs and even structural features of 
the institutional authority, partly because of the role they regard these as 
playing in the scandals discussed briefly above.
A further illustration may be drawn from the history of Christianity. 
Christian unity was shattered in 1054, partly by a  dispute about the 
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nature of the Trinitarian understanding of God. The Eastern churches 
split from the Roman churches over what is called the ‘filioque’ clause (in 
English, ‘and the Son’) in the version of the Creed called Nicene, though 
the phrase was not used at the Council of Nicea in 354 but adopted at later 
Councils. The amended Nicene Creed, after treating of Christ as sharing 
in the Divinity as the Son then proclaims: ‘We believe in the Holy Spirit, 
the Lord, the giver of life who proceeds from the Father and the Son.’ The 
Eastern churches rejected this since they held that the Holy Spirit and the 
Son both directly proceeded from the Father. This was a major doctrinal 
issue behind the Great Schism which created the Orthodox church 
traditions of the East as separate from Rome. Of course there were other 
issues, both theological and non-theological, as there always are. Many 
of these were political or quasi-political and I will say more of the role 
of the political later. But that differences over this wording should have 
had such momentous community consequences strikes me as amazing. 
I cannot understand why such an abstruse technicality as the difference 
over such ‘proceedings’ could be given a religious significance of this sort. 
I can understand how it might exercise a certain sort of theological and 
philosophical mind, but it seems to me irrelevant, hardly even reaching 
the peripheral, in terms of what matters in the Christian message. If the 
Nicene doctrine is a defining belief of the communal authority of the 
Church (not just the Catholic Church but most Protestant churches too) 
then critical reflection that rejects it or its importance surely calls for 
a change in what is of defining importance for membership rather than 
for change of community. It is, I think, significant that the other crucial 
Christian Creed in favour with most Christian denominations, including 
Catholic and some Orthodox, is the more ancient Apostles’ Creed which 
makes no mention of internal relations within the Trinity.
I put this objection, probably not clearly enough, to Linda Zagzebski 
when she gave the lectures from which this book developed in Oxford 
in 2012. In the book, she addresses it in the context of a section on the 
need to resolve dissonance caused within a community by the fact that 
some other community which shares some of the first community’s 
crucial beliefs also has a range of important conflicting beliefs that have 
for them survived conscientious self-reflection. She instances Christian 
and Moslem differences over the nature of God – Christians believing 
in the Trinity and Moslems rejecting that account in favour of a simple 
Unity. In response, she enunciates a Need To Resolve Conflict Principle 
as follows: ‘It is a  demand of rationality for a  community to attempt 
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to resolve putative conflicts between its beliefs and the beliefs of other 
communities.’
She thinks that such conflicts may be resolved in various ways, such 
as changing some of our beliefs, or ‘by adding a belief that explains why 
the dissenting community is mistaken, or by modifying the belief that 
conflicts with the belief of the other community in a way the members 
of the other community would not accept but which resolves our 
own dissonance’ (p.  225). She also thinks that the fact that different 
communities have arrived at beliefs (perhaps different from our own) 
by conscientious reflection on the trustworthiness of those beliefs can 
in principle be recognised by each community and hence arises the 
possibility of advance in removing dissonance by inter-community 
dialogue.
This discussion of disagreement between communities is clearly 
relevant to some of my earlier comments and I will address it shortly. 
First, I want to see how it relates to the filioque issue and its role in the 
Great Schism. Zagzebski says that ‘few theologians now consider it 
worth so much fuss’ and concludes that the degree of the need to resolve 
dissonance within a community ‘depends upon the degree of dissonance 
created within a  community by the conflict. The degree to which 
a community cares about a belief is one dimension affecting degree of 
dissonance’ (p. 225).
There are several things to say about this. The first is that the idea 
that ‘few theologians now consider it worth much fuss’, if true, as it 
may well be, needs to be set against the fact that the phrase and the 
doctrine it represents remain in the Nicene Creed which is recited daily 
in the Catholic Mass and other Christian denominational services. In 
so far as the amended Nicene formula, which include this account of 
‘the procession’ of the persons of the Trinity, define what the Catholic 
and many other Western Christian communities believe then it seems 
they continue to care. In fact, the recitation may not have much if any 
cognitive and psychological resonance today, but then it is unclear how 
much the Western Christian communities cared about this in the 11th 
century. Many theologians cared, it seems, and apparently the Papal and 
Byzantine church and secular authorities cared, but we don’t really know 
how the Catholic faithful felt. In any case, the question is whether all of 
them should have cared enough to split the Church.
The significance of the filioque clause is probably less doctrinal than 
political. The split of 1054 had been brewing since six centuries or more 
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as a conflict of power and authority between Rome and Constantinople. 
It embraced theological and liturgical issues as well, including the role 
of statues and icons, the use of unleavened bread in the Eucharist, but 
very prominently the primacy of the Pope in Rome. Serious historical 
research makes it plain that political motivations both within the 
religious institutions and in the wider political world played a major part 
in creating the widening gulf between the East and West even where 
they continued to have much in common doctrinally, and also impeded 
several genuine attempts at reconciliation.16 It would be a  mistake to 
discount sincere religious motivations, but also to discount the role of 
political motivations, since the two are often entwined.
If this is right, and I cannot marshal the evidence to support it fully 
here, then it illustrates the way that the institutional epistemic authority 
of a community is subject to scrutiny from within by those of its members 
who have reflected on a  spectrum of considerations drawn from 
communal authority elsewhere which the conscientious self can (and 
perhaps must) attend to in its reflection on its trust in the institutional 
authority regarding community beliefs. So, understanding the history 
of the political and cultural forces at work in the controversy over 
‘filioque’ can help the conscientious self determine whether this aspect of 
Trinitarian doctrine is or should be a crucial element of community belief. 
I have instanced here the role of historical authorities, but similar things 
could be said of biblical scholarship which has had an enormous impact 
on the way many Christians understand their faith today. Zagzebski gives 
one example of this about the accuracy of the Acts of the Apostles, but 
there are other cases more directly affecting doctrinal beliefs. Of course, 
there are various problems with the methodology of biblical criticism 
and there are sharp divisions within its ranks, a  feature it shares with 
other disciplines in the Humanities. There are also, as Zagzebski notes, 
questions about whether some of the scholarly conclusions reflect prior 
metaphysical commitments that prejudge the evidence or whether the 
evidence independently supports those metaphysical views, for example, 
16 A good account of these political and religious factors can be found in Diarmaid 
MacCulloch, A History of Christianity; the First Three Thousand Years (London: Allen 
Lane, 2009). See especially Ch. 9, Part 1, and Ch. 10, Part 4. MacCulloch and other 
historians stress the political role played by the Emperor Charlemagne’s conflict with 
Constantinople in bringing the matter to a head, even though at the time Pope Leo III 
refused to make the phrase part of the liturgy in Rome. This inclusion did not occur until 
the 11th century.
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in the acceptability or rejection of miracles. But this merely emphasises 
the complexity of the materials that conscientious reflection must take 
into account.
POLITICS, CORRUPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
Another complicating factor in the case of institutional authority concerns 
the facts of corruption, especially the corrupting influences of power. 
Acton’s famous dictum that ‘all power tends to corrupt and absolute 
power corrupts absolutely’ contains an  insight into the temptations of 
institutional leadership and its authority that has been conspicuously 
vindicated by history. The more that the power of authority is centralised, 
not subject to close scrutiny, and remote from the desires, needs, and 
insights of those subject to it, the more its exercise can be distorted by 
aims inimical to the communal purposes which give it legitimacy. This 
is as true of the epistemological aspects as of the practical. The modern 
movement towards political democracy and its constitutional protection 
of citizen’s rights against the abuse of power arises from an understanding 
that is indebted to the force of Acton’s dictum.
In discussing Raz’s account of political authority, Zagzebski 
comments that he has devised it as a contribution to the literature on 
political freedom within the framework of political liberalism, and 
she interprets this to mean that his account is constrained by a desire 
to maximise political freedom and to minimise political authority. She 
says that this perspective requires that ‘it is more important to devise 
an  account of authority that prevents tyranny than to give the bearer 
of authority the function of assisting the subjects in pursuing their 
individual and collective good’ (p.  140). Consequently, she surmises 
that ‘most modern political thought is motivated more by fear of bad 
authority than by desire for good authority’ (p. 140). She gives no verdict 
on this liberal project, but insists that epistemic authority is different 
in that the oppression that the liberal political project aims to forestall 
rarely applies in the epistemic area, and hence Raz’s liberal constraints 
are ‘not important’ for her project.
There may be some point in this dismissal for cases of non-institutional 
epistemic authority or even lightly institutionalised such authority, but 
once one realises that the exercise of most institutional authority involves 
considerable power vested in the authorities then the room for exercise 
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of that power in misguided, oppressive and corrupt ways is present, and 
the realisation of that fact raises a  question both about the degree to 
which the authority has been distorted by these temptations and about 
the relevance of that answer to the trust to be given to the authority’s 
claims, including knowledge claims.17
In the case of political authority, different people will no doubt answer 
these questions differently, but the widespread mistrust of politicians, 
even in liberal democratic societies, testifies to the verdict that most 
citizens have arrived at, and there is a considerable weight of history, not 
to mention the evidence of contemporary whistleblowers, on their side. 
This degree of mistrust is often lamented by commentators (and of course 
by politicians) and is said to impede good government, but it is unclear 
that more unqualified trust would remedy the situation.18 Structural 
changes in the forms of authority and its implementation are more likely 
to lead to greater trust, though they may of course require trust in some 
authorities to devise them and to bring them about. Zagzebski’s claim 
that most modern political thought is motivated by ‘fear of bad authority 
than by desire for good authority’ poses a  false opposition since the 
desire for good authority should imply a fear of bad authority and the 
latter can motivate alertness to and respect for the former.
In the case of religious authority, it seems to me that points similar to 
the political ‘constraints’ apply as well. Indeed, the liberal and democratic 
spirit that informs the caution about political power and its relation to 
the individual’s freedom should, it seems to me, also inform a similar 
caution about other forms of institutional power, including that in the 
area of religion whether the exercise of that power is practical, moral 
or epistemic. To return to the illustration of Catholicism, the  present 
17 These distortions in the area of knowledge are often assisted by the control that 
political authorities exercise directly or indirectly over the language of communal 
discourse. Consider, for example, the way that the term ‘enhanced interrogation 
techniques’ has gained currency, especially in the United States, in the discussion 
of torture. Our enemies (‘they’) commit ‘torture’ where ‘we’ engage in ‘enhanced 
interrogation techniques’.
18 Political theorists have been much exercised by the nature of trust in political 
authority and institutions, the extent (if any) of its decline, and whether any such decline 
is a good or a bad thing. Notions like ‘social capital’ and ‘civil society’ are often bandied 
about in this connection, and often confusingly so. For good discussions of the complex 
problems in this area see: Mark E. Warren (ed.) Democracy and Trust (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). Unfortunately, space precludes a recourse here to the 
insights of this debate.
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Catholic structures of authority are still modelled on just those 
autocratic forms of political authority towards which the liberal project 
developed such well-justified suspicion. Those forms, I would argue, are 
ill-conceived in terms of a Divine mandate to maintain them at all costs, 
and it is interesting to see that Pope Francis is impatient with many of 
them, as so many ordinary Catholics have already become. But none 
of this is to say that the only resort for religious people is some form of 
epistemic and practical egoism. There remains a place for authority in 
religion, whether epistemic, moral and practical, and it will resemble 
the pattern of trust that Zagzebski so carefully and subtly develops. But 
it will have more stress upon the exemplary authority, it will require 
a more complex picture of community authority, and, while admitting 
the necessity of communal institutions, it will have what we might call 
both selective trust and selective mistrust in their operations and their 
office holders.
Zagzebski laments the ‘disastrous effects’ of the general decline of 
trust in authority in modern life and the denial of a role for authority 
as a condition for human fulfilment. She sees her book is an attempt to 
restore that trust in a modern form (p. 254). Yet such a modern form must 
admit that there are many areas of our lives where we rightly moderate 
the trust we give on the basis of knowledge we have gained from trusted 
others, for example, the cautionary trust many of us have in real estate 
agents and used car dealers, and yet this need not give ammunition to 
general epistemic or emotional egoism. So, a degree of selective mistrust 
for institutional authority, whether political, religious or moral, may 
be precisely what the executive self in its conscientious deliberations 
is rational to adopt. Whether the conscientious self adopts this stance 
will partly depend upon local facts available to that self, concerning, 
for example, the record of specific institutions, but is also likely to be 
influenced by broader political and social outlooks that themselves reflect 
both personal interests and experiences and also trust in sub-communal 
extended selves and exemplars. Consider the institution of policing. In 
liberal democratic societies people in comfortable circumstances and 
with dominant interests within the society that are mostly supported by 
the status quo tend to have an unqualified trust in the police institution, 
whereas the poor and disadvantaged tend to treat the representatives of 
that institution with more qualified trust. These sub-communities will 
tend to have quite different responses to complaints of serious police 
misbehaviour and to police denials of the allegations. The reactions 
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will be even more polarised where the sub-communities differ in racial 
or ethnic composition.19 Of course, sound policing can be a  crucial 
element in establishing and maintaining the rule of law and the security 
of citizens, but the opprobrium of the term ‘police state’ shows the 
potential downside of the institution and hence the need for caution 
about wholehearted institutional trust in this instance.
The idea of selective mistrust may however be thought to create 
a particular problem for a non-reductive analysis of our reliance upon 
the institution (as it were) of testimony. In particular, advocates of that 
analysis (or better, family of analyses) often point to the deep role of non-
inferential trust in testimony that exists, necessarily, it seems in young 
children. Such children develop a framework of language and its concepts, 
and a basic set of reliable beliefs from parents and other adults early in life 
without which they could advance no further epistemically. It seems that 
this important stage proceeds with no recourse to anything like selective 
mistrust. But there are two comments to make on this. The first is that, 
as Thomas Reid insisted, this early state of tutelage is a preliminary to 
later stages that have a more sophisticated critical dimension, and it is 
then that selective mistrust plays a  significant part. Reid says that our 
immature judgement ‘is almost entirely in the power of those who are 
about us in the first period of life. If children were so framed as to pay 
no regard to testimony or authority, they must, in the literal sense, 
perish for lack of knowledge’. He goes on to say: ‘But when our faculties 
ripen, we find reason to check that propensity to yield to testimony and 
to authority ... ’, adding, that nonetheless ‘the natural propensity still 
retains some force’.20 Second, the picture of even very young children 
as totally passive epistemically in the face of adult testimony is, in any 
event, an  unrealistic one, as most parents realise and much empirical 
work confirms. Quite young children ask for explanations, realise that 
some things they are told contradict others, and occasionally find that 
they have been misinformed where one informant testifies contrary to 
another. So, although their reliance on testimony goes very deep and 
helps indicate its significant role in adult life, thereby offering support 
19 The asymmetry of generalised trust in political institutions between groups with 
high socio-economic status and those with lower SES is argued for by the sociologist 
Orlando Patterson in his ‘Liberty against the democratic state: on the historical and 
contemporary sources of American distrust’, in Warren, op. cit., p. 196.
20 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Derek Brookes (ed.) 
(Edinburgh Edinburgh University Press, 2002), Essay VI, Chapter V, section 10.
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to the non-reductionist thesis, the example of early childhood learning 
also shows the incipient presence and emergence of selective mistrust.21
My remarks about religious and political institutions and the idea 
of selective mistrust suggest that the crucial concept of self-trust that 
Zagzebski employs so effectively may also need qualification, or, at 
least, further clarification. The complications of the extended self are 
less conspicuous for the individual self, but they are not entirely absent. 
Modern psychology has made much of divisions within the self, but 
they were also known to the ancients. Zagzebski realises there can be 
dissonance within the conscientious self and makes the need to resolve it 
a significant element in her project. But it is also characteristic of personal 
growth not only to seek the resolution of dissonance in our beliefs, but 
to discover the possibilities of mistrusting oneself: the healthy exercise 
of our cognitive and emotional powers should lead to the realisation 
that these capacities are not only essential to navigating our world and 
flourishing in it, but also prone to lead us astray in a variety of ways. 
Indeed we might say that the capacity for trust requires the robust capacity 
for (selective) mistrust as its other face.22 This may lead to trusting others 
more than we trust ourselves, but it may also lead to seeing that some 
trusted authorities have been led astray by forces and defects we have 
recognised to mistrust in ourselves. These misled authorities may well be 
those of (one of) our own communities and its institutional leadership, 
and insight into this, and the tendencies contributing to it, may come 
from our trust in authoritative knowledge gleaned from communities 
quite outside our own, as well as those in other communities to which 
we belong.
21 For samples of recent empirical work on the relevant capacities of very young 
children, see: ‘Preschoolers’ Search for Explanatory Information Within Adult-Child 
Conversation’, Brandy N. Frazier, Susan A. Gelman, and Henry M. Wellman, Child 
Development, Vol. 80, No. 6 (2009), 1592-1611; and Paul L. Harris and Melissa 
A. Koenig, ‘Trust in Testimony: How Children Learn about Science and Religion’, Child 
Development, Vol. 77, No. 3 (2006), 505-524. My thanks to another (to me anonymous) 
contributor to this volume for raising the issue of child testimony in a comment on this 
chapter. My thanks also to Margaret Coady for alerting me to the scholarly literature on 
the critical capacities of young children.
22 I am indebted for this thought to a comment by Karen Jones on an earlier draft of 
this paper.
